Wto Transparency Mechanism For Regional Trade Agreements

In the face of the challenges posed by growing WTO membership, we reaffirm our common responsibility to ensure internal transparency and effective participation of all members. While emphasizing the intergovernmental nature of the Organization, we are committed to making WTO activities more transparent, including faster information and improved dialogue with the public. We will therefore continue to promote, at the national and multilateral level, a better public understanding of the WTO and to communicate the benefits of a liberal, rules-based multilateral trading system.103 [D]; , the right to additional preferences), rules of origin, provisions on trade in goods (IP, labour, environment, OEE, SPS, aid for trade, if any), specific customs procedures, the composition of imports of products from recipient members, the completion of ACTIVITIES, the relationship with other PTAs by the same notifying member and imports under the PTA over the past three years , if necessary. The report states that this is an assessment of the WTO and a debate on legitimacy issues concerning the WTO. Its nine chapters address key issues such as the relationship between the WTO and globalization and sovereignty (Chapters I and III), the erosion of non-discrimination, mainly due to national protectionism and regional and preferential trade agreements (Chapter II), consensus rule issues, political reinforcement, process efficiency and the WTO`s geometric variable (Chapters VII and VIII). , WTO relations with other international organizations (Chapter IV), transparency and civil society participation (Chapter V), the dispute settlement system (Chapter VI) and administrative challenges and improvements for the secretariat and director-general (Chapter IX). The report is not explicitly and systematically discussed with major institutional problems and power asymmetries within the WTO, nor on the balance between legitimate national regulatory concerns and the principle of non-discrimination. Participation in the WTO has undermined state sovereignty. The WTO has a long scope and concerns a large part of the national legal orders of its members, since trade is ubiquitous.

Other agreements, in particular the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), Technical Barriers to Trade (OTC) and GATS, can hardly allow economists to think about areas in which the WTO does not matter. The Sutherland report adopts an analysis that considers the WTO as one of the many intergovernmental organizations and the reduction of state sovereignty as the product of the proliferation of organizations. This conceals the fact that trade regulation is very effective in national legislation and, since the Uruguay round, the WTO has expanded its scope into a broad area of jurisdiction. As such, national parliaments are de facto ignored. Any discussion of legitimization certainly does not have to propose the fall of the current trading system, however intrusive it may or may seem. Instead, the report could have imposed ways to repoliticize areas of interest in order to re-establish the debates and participation of stakeholders who would have been part of national consultative processes had the WTO not been competent in these areas.

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